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paper   also   presents   some   observations   from   practical   attempts   at   implementing   an   organisation­wide  


















making   security   decisions.   The   ‘super   scope’   brings   this   problem   sharply   into   focus   because  whilst   the 
traditional  ISMS scope is   relatively simple in  terms of organisational hierarchy,  the number of  processes it 
addresses   and   the   organisational   boundaries   that   it   traverses,   the   ‘super   scope’   typically   covers   an   entire 
organisation and the ownership question is therefore much more complex.
Clear Security Ownership – a Necessity for Effective Risk Management












































is  one way to start   to understand the all­encompassing nature of  the process and the fundamental role  that 












risk   assessment   process.   However   in   practical   terms   this   requirement   becomes   more   salient   when   the 
effectiveness of the ISMS is part of the assessor’s scope of enquiry.
THE ROLE OF SECURITY OWNERSHIP WITHIN TRADITIONAL INFORMATION 
SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT
There are many information security risk assessment methodologies and in many of these methodologies the 
issue of ownership appears  to be marginalised. In this  section the extent  is  assessed to which ownership is 
addressed within both a typical computer security approach and a typical business focussed approach to risk 
assessment.
Standard Approaches to Information Security Risk Assessment
The most traditional of the risk assessment methodologies is the one described in ISO/IEC TR 13335­3 and this 
traditional risk assessment process has a number of phases:










The ISO/IEC TR 13335­3  approach  compares with  the  following,  more business­orientated approach,   from 



































Marrying the ISO 27001 Requirements with Traditional Risk Methodologies
As has already been seen, remarkably little is documented about asset identification and security ownership in 
information security risk assessment methodologies. This may be due to the fact that the majority of information 




information assets. A risk assessment methodology such as CRAMM (UK Government's Risk Analysis and 

















































which  uses   the   security   forum  to   support   the   relevant   stakeholders   in   the   risk   assessment   to   identify   risk 
treatment actions  and as  part  of   that   role  ensures  that ownership  is  assigned.  The security   forum need not 
necessarily   include  stakeholders   from one organisation  only.  There  are  numerous   implementation  examples 
where a security forum includes parties from multiple organisations and at this point a facilitator to help assign 
ownership becomes even more significant. 

































The effectiveness of  the decision making process appears weak  in this  model.  The business  owners appear 












and   the  ownership  mappings   a  number   of  processes  must   include   the  maintenance   as  part   of   their   remit, 
including change control, management review and internal audit.
One-tiered Asset Ownership with Centralised Ownership
In this example the asset ownership and therefore the security issues are owned by a centralised information 
systems function. The security ownership of all  issues associated with the information sits  with this  central 
function and controls to address the issues are decided centrally. In this model there is no business ownership. 
The   asset   ownership  model   follows   the   traditional   hardware,   software,   information   asset   listings.  The   risk 
assessment which accompanies it is a traditional information security risk assessment that considers the impacts 













































dependent on this  model as  it   is   the mechanism through the which the business engages with security and 
assumes security as part of its day to day operation. This requirement entails that there must be much better 
models of asset definition and of decision making within information security risk processes that are capable of 
effective implementation within complex scopes and that are enshrined as part of the guidance that supports the 
ISMS standard. 
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